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BUILDING THE KOREAN FILM INDUSTRY'S
COMPETITIVENESS: ABOLISH THE SCREEN QUOTA
AND SUBSIDIZE THE FILM INDUSTRY
Carolyn Hyun-Kyung Kim
Abstract: Under Korean law, local theaters in Korea must show Korean films for
at least 146 days each year. In 1998, this screen quota became the subject of heated
debate between the United States and the Korean film industry when the United States
demanded that Korea abolish it. The United States believes the quota violates free trade
principles, while the Korean film industry argues that cultural products such as films
cannot be equated with other commercial commodities. Cultural identities must be
protected because a diversified global culture benefits all. Domestic film industries
should be protected because films constitute a vehicle for transmitting cultural values.
One way to promote Korean culture is to encourage the production of films that portray
Korean culture and to ensure that these films are commercially viable. Korea's screen
quota does not ensure that Korean films will depict Korean culture; instead, it merely
requires films made in Korea to be shown in theatres. The screen quota is also
problematic because it encourages complacency on the part of the Korean film industry
toward domestic and global competitors. Government subsidies tied to film quality and
cultural content, on the other hand, would promote Korean culture and ensure that
Korean films are commercially viable. In Europe, subsidies have proven to be effective
in stimulating domestic film industries to produce quality films that are commercially
viable. Through subsidies, the Korean government can ensure that Korean culture will be
preserved and promoted through film.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1966, Korean law has mandated that Korean theaters show
Korean-made films for a certain number of days each year.' This screen
quota was originally promulgated to "filter out Western influences. 2 The
law has undergone a series of amendments and currently, requires theaters to
show Korean films for at least 146 days each year. Despite this law,
Korean films only accounted for fifteen to twenty-five percent of theater
' Kim Wan-soon, 2000nyun Round (Millenium Rounduh) Service Hyupsangkwa Screen Quotaje
[Year 2000 Round (Millennium Round) Service Negotiation and Screen Quota System], in SCREEN
QUOTAWA MOONWHA JOOKYON [SCREEN QUOTA AND CULTURAL SOVEREIGNTY] 175, 179 (Won Yong Jin
et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter SCREEN QUOTA AND CULTURAL SOVEREIGNTY].
2 Song Jung A, Film: Protect or Destroy: A Screen Quota System in South Korea Has Helped Its
Film Industry Flower; but a Proposed Reduction and a Potential Flood of Hollywood Productions
Threatens the Industry's Future, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 4, 1999, available in 1999 WL-FEER 8684397.
3 Enforcement Decree of the Promotion of the Motion Pictures Industry Act, Presidential Decree
No. 15085 (adopted June 29, 1996, amended Oct. 2, 1997) art. 19(1), translated in 7 KOREA LEGISLATION
RESEARCH INST., STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 881, 889 (1998) [hereinafter Presidential Decree];
see also Hwang Jang-jin, Debates Flare up over Plan to Reduce Mandatory Showing of Local Movies,
KOREA HERALD (June 14, 1999) <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>.
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ticket sales in Korea between 1993 and 1998. 4 Furthermore, the law has not
helped the Korean film industry promote Korean culture.
5
The screen quota has become a controversial issue in Korea because
the United States is demanding that it be abolished.6 The entertainment
industry is the second-largest export industry in the United States,7 and the
United States wants its film industry to enjoy free access to global markets.8
By requiring that Korean films be shown for 146 days each year, the screen
quota reduces the number of days that U.S. films can be shown in Korean
theaters, 9 and thus prevents the American film industry from enjoying full,
unobstructed access to the Korean market. Some Koreans view the U.S.
demand to abolish the screen quota as an attempt to inundate the Korean
market with films that reflect American values' 0 and accuse the United
States of engaging in "cultural imperialism."" In response to U.S. pressure,
the Korean film industry has mounted a strong lobbying effort to keep the
screen quota intact. 12  The Korean government, however, has sent mixed
signals on the screen quota.1
3
This Comment examines the history and effectiveness of Korea's
screen quota law and argues that the screen quota should be replaced with
government subsidies to the film industry. Part II describes the history of
the screen quota in Korea, examines relevant statistics on the Korean film
4 Song Jung A, supra note 2; Park Jiwon, Address at the "Younghwa Jinhung Jungchak"
(Motion Picture Promotion Policies) Announcement Press Conference, available in Ministry of Culture
and Tourism Homepage (Mar 30, 2000) <http://www.mct.go.kr/uw3/dispatcher/dataroom/speech/
speech_s.html?oid=@355781415)>. In 1999, Korean films accounted for 36% of ticket sales. The surge
in the Korean film industry's market share in 1999 is attributed to external factors, such as the lack of
Hollywood box office hits. See infra Part II.C. 1.
5 See infra Part II.C.3.
6 Hwang Jang-jin, Film Industry Disputes Free-Market Policy, KOREA HERALD (July 2, 1999)
<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>.
7 Thomas M. Murray, The US. -French Dispute over GA 77 Treatment ofAudiovisual Products and
the Limits of Public Choice Theory: How an Efficient Market Solution Was "Rent-Seeking ", 21 MD. J.
INT'L L. & TRADE 203, 207 (1999). The U.S. entertainment industry "generates foreign revenues of
approximately $18 billion annually and has produced a trade surplus of $4 billion in 1992 alone." Id. The
largest export industry in the United States is the aerospace industry. Id.
Jung Jae Hyung, Hollywood-ui Segye Shijang Jullyak [Hollywood's Global Strategy], in SCREEN
QUOTA AND CULTURAL SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 1, at 243, 257.
9 CHUNG JOONG HUN, Woo RI YOUNG HWA SALLIGI [RESCUING OUR MOVIEs] 6-30 (1999).
'0 Sim Kwang Hyun, Hangook Younghwa Sanupui Balfunul Ouihan Pilyochogunkwa Screen Quota
[Screen Quota and the Necessary Preconditions for the Development of the Korean Film Industry], in
SCREEN QUOTA AND CULTURAL SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 1, at 19,41.
I11 d.
12 Kim Si-moo, Screen Quotuh Sasso Toojang-ui Pilyosung-kwa Tangoui-song [The Need for and
Legitimacy of the Fight to Keep the Screen Quota Law], in SCREEN QUOTA AND CULTURAL SOVEREIGNTY,
supra note 1, at 116, 121-30.
13 Ministries Dissent on Screen Quota System for Local Films, KOREA HERALD (Dec. 19, 1998)
<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr> [hereinafter Ministries Dissent].
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industry, and explores the screen quota debate between the United States and
Korea. Part III examines screen quotas and film subsidy programs in other
parts of the world. It argues that subsidy programs have been more effective
than screen quotas in promoting the production of quality films that are
commercially viable. Part IV argues that to protect and promote Korean
culture, the Korean government should invigorate the Korean film industry
and encourage it to produce quality cultural products that appeal to the
public and thus will be watched by the public. To achieve these goals, the
Korean government should repeal the screen quota and replace it with
government subsidies that are tied to the quality, Korean cultural content,
and commercial viability of domestic films.
II. THE SCREEN QUOTA AND SUBSIDIES: THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE
The screen quota has a thirty-year history in Korea. 14  Since its
enactment in 1966,15 the screen quota law has undergone a series of
changes 16 and now requires Korean movie theaters to show Korean films for
at least 146 days each year. 17 Despite its long history, the screen quota has
neither helped the Korean film industry to compete against foreign films nor
effectively promoted Korean culture.
A. The History of Screen Quotas in Korea
In 1961, Korean President Park Chung Hee promulgated the Motion
Picture Law.'8  Under the Motion Picture Law, the government exerted
control over the film industry by (1) establishing criteria for setting up film
companies, (2) requiring all film companies to register with authorities, and
(3) reorganizing existing film companies. 19 Most of the Motion Picture
14 Kim Hyu-jong, Screen Quotuhjewa Hangook Younghwa Samup [The Screen Quota and the
Korean Movie Industry], in SCREEN QUOTA AND CULTURAL SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 1, at 64, 77.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Presidential Decree, supra note 3, art. 19.
'8 LEE YONG-IL & CHOE YOUNG-CHOL, THE HISTORY OF KOREAN CINEMA 145 (Motion Picture
Promotion Corporation ed., Richard Lynn Greever trans., 2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter LEE & CHOE]. Park
Chung Hee rose to power in 1961 after the successful military coup. Despite Park's iron-fisted rule, many
in Korea agree that he brought much-needed economic vitality to a war-ravaged Korea and lifted Korea
from obscurity. His authoritarian regime lasted for nearly two decades and came to an end when Park was
assassinated by his intelligence chief in 1979. See Chon Shi-yong, Thousands Pay Tribute to Former
President Park, KOREA HERALD (Oct. 27, 1999) <http://koreaherald.co.kr>; Historians Oppose Planned
Park Chung Hee Memorial, KOREA HERALD (Oct. 26, 1999) <http://koreaherald.co.kr>.
19 LEE & CHOE, supra note 18, at 145-46.
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Law's provisions were promulgated to restrict the film industry.2" Under
this law, Park's dictatorial regime censored Korean films and discouraged
the production of anti-establishment films and films containing criticism of
the government.21
Since its enactment, the Motion Picture Law has undergone a series of
amendments.22 The original Article 19 of the Motion Picture Law stated that
the government was to support international relations and development
through motion pictures by encouraging the production of excellent motion
23pictures. On August 3, 1966, in order to filter out unwanted Western
influences,24 the Korean government amended Article 19 and added a
provision that designated how many foreign films could be shown in
proportion to Korean films. 25 In 1970, the law was amended to state that
Korean films must be shown for at least thirty days each year.26 In 1973 and
1985, this requirement was raised to 121 and 146 days, respectively.
27
In 1995, the government passed the Promotion of the Motion Pictures
Industry Act ("the Act"), which replaced the Motion Picture Law.28 Article
1 states that the purpose of the Act is "to contribute to the improvement of a
citizens' cultural life and the promotion of the national culture by striving to
improve the quality of the motion picture art and driving forward the
fostering and development of the motion picture industry." 29 Article 16 of
the newly enacted Promotion of the Motion Pictures Industry Act preserved
the essence of Article 19 of the old Motion Picture Law.
30
20 KIM Soo NAM, HANGOOK YOUNGHWA-UI JANGJUMKWA SAYOU [CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING
AND REASONS FOR KOREAN MOVIES] 288 (1997).
21 LEE & CHOE, supra note 18, at 145. The Motion Picture Law empowered the Korean government
to strictly censor films in Korea. The government created a censorship board that had the authority to
censor film scripts before and after shooting and confiscated many films that were deemed pro-Communist
or obscene. For example, "Byo Sok-ui Yo-ja" (The Woman in the Wall, 1969), "Nae si" (The Eunuch) and
"No-ui Irumun Yo-Ja" (Your Name is Woman) were each confiscated on the charge of being obscene. The
government banned "0 Bal Tan" (Aimless Bullet) and confiscated "Chil In-ui Yo Poro" (7 Female
Prisoners) for portraying pro-Communist sentiments. Id. at 147.
22 Kim Hyu-jong, supra note 14.
23 LEE & CHOE, supra note 18, at 272.
24 Song Jung A, supra note 2.
25 LEE & CHOE, supra note 18, at 272-73.
26 Kim Hyu-jong, supra note 14.
27 Id.
28 Younghwa Jinhung Bop [Promotion of the Motion Pictures Industry Act] (adopted Dec. 30, 1995,
amended Apr. 10, 1997), translated in KOREA LEGISLATION RESEARCH INST., supra note 3, at 861, 869
(1998); see also id. addenda, art. 3.
29 Id. art. 1.
30 Id. art. 16.
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B. The Current Screen Quota Law
Article 16 of the Act and Article 19 of the Enforcement Decree of the
Promotion of the Motion Pictures Industry Act ("Enforcement Decree")
together establish what is commonly known as the screen quota.3' Article
16 of the Act states that "The person who operates a public performance
place where the motion pictures are screened . . . shall screen the Korean
motion pictures for more than such number of days as determined by the
Presidential Decree. 32 According to Article 19 of the Enforcement Decree:
(1) Any manager of a theatre who screens motion pictures as
prescribed in Article 16 of the Act, shall show Korean
motion pictures for not less than two fifths of the annual
screening days.
(2) If it is deemed particularly necessary to do so in
consideration of the supply and demand situation of
Korean motion pictures, the Minister of Culture and
Tourism may, notwithstanding the provision of
Paragraph (1) of this Article, reduce the number of the
33
annual screening days of Korean motion pictures ....
Thus, under the current screen quota law, Korean movie theaters must show
Korean films for at least 146 days each year.34 The law gives discretion to
the Minister of Culture and Tourism to reduce the required number of days
to 106 in certain circumstances.
35
Theaters that violate the screen quota may have their business
privileges suspended. If a theater fails to show films for the mandated
number of showing days and the violation is for a deficiency of less than
twenty days, its business privileges will be suspended one day for every day
of the deficiency. 36 If the deficiency exceeds twenty days, the suspension is
three days for each day of the deficiency.37 Local and regional governments
31 Kim Wan-soon, supra note 1.
32 Promotion of the Motion Pictures Industry Act, supra note 28, art. 16.
33 Presidential Decree, supra note 3, art. 19.
3 Id. art. 19(l); see also Hwang Jang-jin, supra note 3. Two fifths of 365 is 146.
3 Presidential Decree, supra note 3, art. 19(2). The Minister of Culture and Tourism can reduce the
number of annual screening days of Korean motion pictures by 20 to 40 days depending on the size of the
town. Id.
36 Id. art. 20(1).
31 Id. art. 20(3).
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oversee the implementation and enforcement of the screen quota
requirements.38
C. The Current Status of the Korean Film Industry
1. Market Share
Market share statistics for the Korean film industry suggest that the
Korean people prefer to see foreign films. For example, American films
accounted for 64% of total box office ticket sales in Korea in 1997, while
domestic productions accounted for 25.5%. 39 Hong Kong and European
films accounted for the remainder.4 ° In 1997, Korean films and foreign
films drew approximately 12 million and 55 million Korean moviegoers,
respectively. 41  Table 1 shows the Korean film industry share of the
domestic Korean film market from 1993 to 1999.
Table 1. Korean Film Industry Statistics 42
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Number of
Korean films 64 65 64 65 59 43 -
produced
Korean filmindustrymarket share 15.9 20.5 20.9 23.1 25.5 25.1 36.1
(percent)
Admission 7.69 9.93 9.44 9.77 12.12 12.60
(in millions)
In 1999, the Korean film industry's market share increased to 36%.
The industry attributes the increase to an improved distribution system,
increased capital inflow into the industry from the business community, and
38 Kim Joongi, The Viability of Screen Quotas in Korea: The Cultural Exception Under the
International Trade Regime, 26 KOREAN J. INT'L & COMP. L. 199, 233 (1998).
39 Song Jung A, supra note 2.
40 Id.
41 Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 239 tbl. 1.
42 Kim Hyu-jong, supra note 14, at 73 tbl. 4; Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 239 tbl. I; Park Jiwon,
supra note 4.
43 Park Jiwon, supra note 4.
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technical improvements."a However, some industry members argue that
"external forces" are primarily responsible for this record performance in
1999.45 They argue that the Korean movie industry benefited from the lack
of Hollywood box office hits in 199946 and the Korean public's sympathy
toward the Korean film industry in its struggle against U.S. demands to
abolish the screen quota.47
2. The Number of Film Productions in Korea
Theater owners argue that they cannot comply with the screen quota
without losing money because too few Korean films are made to enable
them to meet the quota.48 The number of Korean films made annually has
decreased over the years and now averages about fifty per year.49 The Asian
economic crisis has contributed to the decline in film production in Korea. 50
Regardless of the annual output of the Korean film industry, the screen quota
mandates that each theater show Korean films for at least 146 days each
year.5' Not all Korean films become box office hits,52 but theater owners
must show these films to meet the screen quota.53 Thus, theater owners face
losses because the limited number of Korean films makes it impossible for
them to comply with the screen quota and make a profit.
54
3. The Quality of Korean Films
Critics of the Korean film industry deplore the lack of quality in
Korean films. 55  First, they argue that Korean culture is either
44 Choe Yong-shik, Local Films Dazzle Audiences, Critics in 1999; Action Thriller "Swiri'" Seen by
Nearly One Seventh of Entire Population, KOREA HERALD (Dec. 27, 1999) <http://koreaherald.co.kr>.45 Lee Myung Cho, Hangook Younghwa Dooduruhjin Sungjangseh [Noticeable Growth of the
Korean Film Industry], DIGITAL CHOSUNILBO [DIGITAL CHOSUN DAILY] (Dec. 2, 1999) <http://
www.chosunilbo.com>.
46 Id.
41 Choe Yong-shik, supra note 44.
48 Hwang Jang-jin, supra note 3.
49 Id.; Kim Hyu-jong, supra note 14, at 73 tbl. 4.
50 Song Jung A, supra note 2.
51 Presidential Decree, supra note 3, art. 19(1), (2); see also supra text accompanying note 34.
52 Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 234.
53 Presidential Decree, supra note 3, art. 19.
54 Hwang Jang-jin, supra note 3.
55 KIM Soo NAM, supra note 20, at 208-27; CHOI JIN YONG ET AL., HANGOOK YOUNGHWA
JUNGCHAK-UI HURUM-KWA SAEROUN JUNGMANG [THE DIRECTION AND THE PROSPECT OF KOREAN MOVIE
INDUSTRY POLICIES] 142 (1995). The Korean film industry's history has been marred by extensive
government regulation. Korean films were at times used as propaganda tools for certain dictatorial
regimes. Now, the Korean film industry needs to overcome its weaknesses and build its strength in order to
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misrepresented or absent in Korean films.56 Second, in terms of technology
and innovation, the critics argue that the Korean film industry has not kept
pace with its counterparts in Europe or the United States.57
Korean films often ignore and/or misrepresent Korea.58 For example,
despite the fact that Korea does not allow citizens to own firearms, 59 the
movie "Nooga Narul Michigae Hanunga" (Who's Driving Me Crazy), told
the story of a man who takes revenge on his enemies with a shotgun.6 °
According to film critic Kim Soo Nam, while many Korean people adhere to
basic Korean ethics that emphasize harmony and proper order in society and
view self-centeredness as the "primary root of evil, '61 some Korean films
legitimize extramarital affairs and ignore the social status of the characters.62
Kim argues that even though Korean films are made, Korean culture is often
wholly absent from these films. 63  Film critic Kim Jong-won a4rees that
Korean filmmakers are losing their social and historical awareness.
The Korean film industry's history of plagiarism also supports the
argument that Korean culture is not represented in Korean films. Many
Korean films have been controversial because of their similarities to
Japanese and Hong Kong films. 65 In 1997, the makers of the film "Contact,"
regain its cultural identity and sovereignty. Id.; Hong Chansik, "Moonwha " Udie Itna? [Culture, Where Is
It?], DONG A ILBO [DONG A DAILY] (Sept. 7, 1999) <www.dongailbo.co.kr>.56 KIM Soo NAM, supra note 20, at 225; see Hwang Jang-jin, 1997, Tough Year for Korean Film
Industry; Sluggish Production, Lack of Quality Work Stir Crisis Debate, KOREA HERALD (Dec. 22, 1997)
<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>.
57 KIM Soo NAM, supra note 20, at 222.
58 Id. at 213-16; see also Hong Chansik, supra note 55.
59 The Law Controlling Firearms, Swords, and Explosives strictly limits the possession of firearms to
public officials who are required to possess firearms in performing their duties; legally licensed
manufacturers, dealers, importers, exporters, and the employees of such traders; and those who are
designated as possessors of firearms by Presidential decree. Chongpo, Dogum, Hwayakryu dung
Dansokbop [Law Controlling Firearms, Swords, and Explosives] (adopted Aug. 4, 1984, multiple
amendments) art. 10, reprinted in 12 HYUNHAENG BOPLYUNGJIP [STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA]
475 (1999).
60 KIM Soo NAM, supra note 20, at 214.
" Michael C. Kalton, Korean Ideas and Values, in KOREAN LAW IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 99, 101(1996); see also KIM Soo NAM, supra note 20, at 216. Adopted in 1392 as a state ideology, Confucianism
is still strong in Korea. Confucian norms still dictate Korean people's daily lives. Erin Cho, Caught in
Confucius 'Shadow: The Struggle for Women 's Legal Equality in South Korea, 12 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 125,
125 (1998).
62 KIM Soo NAM, supra note 20, at 214. The movie "Manura Jukyigi" (Wife Killing) portrayed a
husband killing his wife in a manner that is lighthearted and comedic; "Ummaegye Aein yi Sanghiut-u-yo"
(Mama Has a Boyfriend) legitimizes having extramarital affairs to satisfy one's sexual frustrations; Kim
Sunghong's "Sontop" (Fingernail) ignores the main characters' social status in order to dramatize its story
line. Id.
613 Id. at 222.
'A Hwang Jang-jin, supra note 56.65 Hwang Jang-jin, 'Contact' Entangled in Plagiarism Debate; Producer to File Lawsuit Against
Critic, Magazine over Allegations, KOREA HERALD (Nov. 15, 1997) <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>.
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the year's highest grossing Korean film, became embroiled in a plagiarism
debate because of the film's similarities to the Japanese film "Haru."66 The
makers of "Holiday in Seoul" were accused of copying Hong Kong films.67
These plagiarism problems lend support to the argument that Korean films
are not focusing on Korean culture.
Some commentators on the screen quota debate argue that by
protecting Korean films with this type of "artificial protection," the
government has failed to encourage technological innovation in the Korean
film industry.68  For example, when the Korean film "301 302," which
originally only cost 280 million won (approximately $330,000)69 to
produce,70 was exported to the United States in 1996, the studio that
produced the film had to spend an additional 1.6 billion won (approximately
$1.9 million) in order to fix technological problems.71 Subtitles also cause
many technological problems.72 The outdated technology that is used by
many Korean film studios to imprint subtitles onto films makes editing
subtitles very difficult.73 These technological problems often cause major
embarrassment for Korean films that are entered in foreign film festivals.74
Critics of the screen quota argue that it only guarantees that a certain
quantity of Korean-made films will be made, and that it has discouraged
technical innovation in the film industry, preventing the industry from
achieving global appeal.75
The current status of the Korean film industry suggests that the screen
quota has not been effective in promoting the industry. Thirty years after the
screen quota came into effect, the Korean film industry is still struggling to
compete against foreign film companies. The lack of quality in Korean
films also suggests that the screen quota has not promoted Korean culture.
66Id.
6'7 Hwang Jang-jin, supra note 56.
68 Lee So-Yon, Movie Trade Dispute Draws on Many Characters, Bus. KOREA, Jan. 1, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 12435390.
69 At the end of 1996, the exchange rate was 844.15 won to I U.S. dollar. INT'L MONETARY FUND,
52 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK 17 (1999).
70 KIM So NAM, supra note 20, at 222.
71 Id. Under common practice, filmmakers around the world record background music, sound
effects, and actors' voices separately. However, because of the filmmakers' ignorance of this simple rule,
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D. The Screen Quota Debate
The screen quota became controversial when the United States
demanded that it be abolished. 6 To counter the claims of the United States
that the screen quota constitutes government manipulation of the
marketplace, has the effect of meddling in the affairs of consumers, and thus
violates free trade principles, 7 the Korean film industry has argued that the
law is needed to protect and promote Korean culture.78 Faced with the U.S.
demands and the Korean film industry's resistance to these demands, the
Korean government initially failed to take a firm stance on the issue.
Recently, however, it announced that it would keep the screen quota and
also provide subsidies to the Korean film industry.79
1. Pressure to Abolish the Screen Quota
The United States continues to pressure Korea to repeal the screen
quota. 80 The United States has a strong interest in pursuing the complete
opening of global entertainment markets because the entertainment industry
is its second largest export industry.1 In 1998, when Korea initiated the
negotiation of the Bilateral Investment Treaty ("BIT") with the United
States, the United States seized the opportunity to demand that Korea
82abolish the screen quota. The screen quota was a major obstacle to
reaching an agreement in August 1999, when Korean President Kim Dae-
Jung visited the United States for another round of negotiations on the BIT.83
In response to mounting pressure from the United States, the Korean
government proposed reducing the quota to ninety-two days.84 The United
76 See Kim Hee Kyung, Ban Hollywood Gongdong Junsun Goochuk [Establishing Allied Forces
Against Hollywood], DONG A ILBO [DONG A DAILY] (May 20, 1999) <www.dongailbo.co.kr>. Korean
filmmakers assembled to protest the U. S. demand that the Korean screen quota be abolished. Id.77 The United States' argument is not based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade("GATT"); GATT exempts cultural products from its provisions. See General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- 1l, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. IV [hereinafter GATT].
78 See Tto Screen Quota Homulgiinga [Abolishing Screen Quota Again?], CHOStIN ILBO [CHOSUN
DAILY] (June 15, 1999) <www.chosunilbo.com> [hereinafter Abolishing Screen Quota].
79 See Ministries Dissent, supra note 13; Hong Chansik, supra note 55.
go Hwang Jang-jin, Film Industry's Plea for Screen Quota Turns Emotional, KOREA HERALD (June
18, 1999) <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>; CHUNG JOONG HUN, supra note 9, at 20.
st Murray, supra note 7.
82 Kim Hyu-jong, supra note 14, at 76.
83 Lee Hae-Young, Shin Jayoujouijuk Jiguhwawa Hanmitooja Hyupjung (BIT) [Neo-Democratic
Globalization and Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)], in SCREEN QUOTA AND CULTURAL SOVEREIGNTY,
supra note 1, at 133, 133 (1999).
" Hwang Jang-jin, supra note 3.
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States wanted a complete abolition of the quota, however, and rejected the
proposal.8 5
The U.S. film industry has also played a major role in pressuring the
Korean government to repeal the screen quota. American film moguls have
voiced their disapproval of the screen quota8 6 and have also offered more
investment in the Korean film industry in return for the abolition of the
screen quota.8 7 Most U.S. films that ranked in the top ten in terms of Korean
box office ticket sales reaped close to fifty percent of their total profits from
overseas markets.88  U.S. films cannot do well financially without
maintaining these overseas markets.89 Because of the U.S. film industry's
success in marketing its products overseas, the film industry has become one
of the most important trade industries in the United States.90 To ensure their
unlimited access to the Korean market, U.S. filmmakers reportedly offered
to invest $500 million in the Korean domestic film and theater business in
exchange for the removal of the screen quota.91 The head of the American
Film Producers Association, Jack Valenti, has also urged that the quota be
repealed.92 During a recent visit to Korea in March 1999, Valenti suggested
that American filmmakers would provide the training necessary for the
Korean film industry to become more competitive.93
The U.S. government and film industry rely on the principles of free
markets, free trade, and free speech in arguing that the screen quota should
be abolished.94 They argue that open competition would stimulate the
Korean film industry to produce better products and would benefit the
industry in the long run.95 Opening the market, they argue, would induce
more foreign investment that would help the Korean industry flourish.96
After the initial shock of the abolition wears off, the industry would adjust to
85 Id.
86 Gregg Jones, Korean Director Fights to Keep Movie Quota System, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Apr. 21, 1999, available in 1999 WL 4115187.
87 Hollywood Set to Invest $US500 MLN in South Korea, ASIA PULSE, Apr. 18, 1998, available in
1998 WL 2956660.
s Jung Jae Hyung, supra note 8, at 252.
89 Id.
90 Id.
9' Fostering the VisualArts, Bus. KOREA, June 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 14378521.
92 Jones, supra note 86.
93 Hwang Jang-jin, supra note 80.
94 Judith Beth Prowda, US. Dominance in the "Marketplace of Culture" and the French "Cultural
Exception", 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 193, 208 (1997). "The debate over the 'cultural exception'
juxtaposes the European notion of the necessity for some form of cultural protectionism and the profound
American belief in freedom of expression, choice and what Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes termed the 'free
trade in ideas."' Id.; see also Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 228.
95 Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 228.
96 Id.
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the new environment and eventually gain its competitive edge.97 The United
States also argues that consumers, as "the ultimate arbiters of the market
place, 98 should be given the freedom to choose what they want to see,99 and
that artists should have the freedom to propagate their art.'00 In other words,
an ideal cultural market is one in which both consumers are free to choose
and artists are free to express themselves. In short, the U.S. government and
the U.S. film industry see films in economic terms; films are commercial
products that should be subject to market forces.
2. The Korean Film Industry's Reaction
Korean filmmakers, actors, and their supporters have banded together
and pursued radical actions to raise public awareness on the screen quota
issue. Their campaign to educate and inform the public about the screen
quota controversy began in earnest in July 1998, when the Emergency
Committee to Protect the Screen Quota ("Emergency Committee") was
formed by film industry members. 101 With the support of various civic
organizations, filmmakers and actors began taking to the streets to protest
the government's proposal to cut the quota.'0 2 Some shaved their heads as a
symbolic gesture. 1°3 The Emergency Committee issued a statement in which
it likened the Korea-United States BIT talks to the annexation of Korea by
Japan. 104  Activists went on a hunger strike in opposition to the
97 Lee So-Yon, supra note 68.
98 Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 228.
99 Id.
100 Id.
'0' Kim Si-moo, supra note 12, at 121-22.
102 Id. at 126. On July 30, 1998, 500 people from the film industry attended a rally supporting the
measure. Id. On December 1, 1998, 1,000 film industry members held an overnight rally at Myong-Dong
Cathedral. Id. Seven hundred people who belonged to various civic organizations and the film industry
held an overnight vigil at Kwang Hwa Moon Road on December 10, 1998. Id.
103 Id. at 122. On June 16, 1999, eight prominent filmmakers shaved their heads in protest of
demands by the United States that Korea abolish the screen quota. Id. In Soonrye, a film director, was
quoted as saying, "My hair will grow back, but the Korean movies, once destroyed, will never regenerate."
Id. Following his lead, 101 more people shaved their heads on June 18, 1999. 1d. Later in the month, as
11 more film industry members shaved their heads, skirmishes with the police caused two people to be
hospitalized in critical condition. Id.
,o4 Id. at 126. In 1905, following the Russo-Japanese War, Korea signed a treaty with Japan making
itself a Japanese protectorate and delegating its foreign affairs power to Japan. Korea remained under
Japanese rule until 1945. Therefore, drawing similarities between the annexation of Korea and the signing
of the BIT with the United States has powerful symbolic meaning for Koreans. See Edward J. Baker, The
Role ofLegal Reforms in the Japanese Annexation and Rule of Korea 1905-1919, in INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF KOREA 185, 185-86 (1983); Gregory Henderson, Human Rights in South
Korea 1945-1953, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOREA 125, 125-26 (1991).
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government's proposal to relax the quota. 10 5 Some civic organizations
campaigned to boycott American films.
106
Screen quota advocates argue that Korean films must be protected and
that the screen quota can effectuate this goal. The industry has made an
impassioned plea that films can serve as a tool for promoting a nation's
culture in the global community 0 7 and thus should not be sacrificed for
purely economic considerations.' 0 8  They also argue the screen quota is
necessary because films require a unique medium, namely film screens.
10 9
According to the advocates, because films are worthless reels unless shown
in theaters," 0 the screen quota is desperately needed to make sure that
Korean films make their way onto the screen.'
The Korean film industry has found support for its position in
international agreements that exempt cultural products from international
trade rules. 12 In the Uruguay Round, 1 3 parties to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") recognized a cultural exception to trade
rules that permits some protection of domestic film industries." 4 The use of
screen quotas is explicitly condoned under Article IV of GATT, which states
"[i]f any contracting party established or maintains internal quantitative
regulations relating to exposed cinematograph films, such regulations shall
take the form of a screen quota."'" 5  By using this cultural protection
argument and engaging in street protests, the proponents of the screen quota
successfully stimulated a public debate on the screen quota issue.
105 John Larkin, Koreans Fear a Global Menace, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 26, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 19375899.
106 Id. The Korean film industry campaigned to have moviegoers boycott the movie "Star Wars" for
one day on July 1, 1999. In 1998, Korean moviegoers boycotted James Cameron's movie "Titanic." Id.
See Movies and the Free Market, KOREA HERALD (June 29, 1999) <http://www.koreanherald.
co.kr>.
108 Lee So-Yon, supra note 68. To use the economic concept of sacrificing the movie industry to
conclude the BIT would be to ignore the promise made to the Korean people that the government would
protect Korean culture. See Abolishing Screen Quota, supra note 78.
109 CHUNG JOONG HUN, supra note 9, at 21.
110 Id.
Id.
112 Lee So-Yon, supra note 68.
"3 The Uruguay Round was the eighth round of the GATT multilateral trade negotiations. The
Uruguay Round produced the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. Philip Raworth & Linda C. Reif, Summary to THE LAW OF THE
WTO: FINAL TEXT OF THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 2-3 (1995); RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 70 (1994).
114 See Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 218.
"3 GATT, supra note 77, art. IV. However, subsection d states that "screen quotas shall be subject to
negotiation for their limitation, liberalization or elimination." Id.
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3. The Korean Government's Response
The Korean government has not responded uniformly to the screen
quota debate. Different government agencies have had conflicting responses
to the screen quota issue.' 16  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
("MFAT") called for a gradual phase-out of the quota in order to induce
greater investment from the United States, which would provide a much-
needed boost to the Korean economy. 17 In contrast, President Kim Dae-
Jung expressed his support for the quota in a meeting with William Daley,
United States Commerce Secretary.' 18 The Ministry of Culture and Tourism
("MCT") first appeared to support the MFAT position, but later decided to
maintain the current quota until domestic films command forty percent of
the Korean film market.' 19 In June 1999, the MCT announced that it would
consider reducing the screen quota.120 These conflicting messages from the
government have frustrated the Korean film industry.
121
Against this backdrop, the MCT again reversed its stance and
announced that it would provide more protection to the Korean film
industry. 122 On March 30, 2000, the MCT announced its "Motion Picture
Promotion Policies," which are aimed at increasing the annual output of the
Korean film industry to 150 films and helping the Korean film industry
capture fifty percent of the domestic market by the year 2004.123 In order to
achieve these goals, the MCT has decided to give subsidies to the Korean
film industry and vowed to keep fighting U.S. demands to abolish the screen
quota. 124 The MCT is currently working on the details of the subsidy plan
and will soon be announcing the specific provisions of the plan.
125
116 Ministries Dissent, supra note 13.
117 Id.
118 Id.
"9 Id. The rift between the foreign affairs and trade officials and the culture minister became
apparent in 1998. Han Duck Soo, the Korean chief negotiator at the bilateral talks with the United States,
agreed to reduce the screen quota, but told film industry leaders that the culture minister would have the
final say as to whether or not the quota would be scrapped. Id. The MCT supported Han's effort, only to
change its stance and announce that it would retain the current screen quota. Id. At this news, the officials
at the MFAT responded angrily that Korea had already agreed with the United States that it would reduce
the screen quota. Id.
120 Hwang Jang-j in, supra note 3.
121 Hong Chansik, supra note 55.
122 Lee Myung Cho, 'Hangook Younghwa Jinhung Jonghap Kyehoak' Balpyo ['Korean Motion
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Korea's screen quota became controversial when the United States
and the U.S. film industry demanded that the Korean government abolish it.
In response to mounting pressure from the United States, the Korean film
industry launched a strong lobbying effort, arguing that films should be
treated as cultural products and that the screen quota is needed to protect and
promote Korean culture. However, critics argue that Korean culture is not
reflected in Korean films and that the screen quota has actually hurt the
nation's film industry by discouraging technological innovation and the
production of quality films. Moreover, despite the screen quota's thirty-year
history, Korean films continue to have difficulty capturing market share
against foreign films. The MCT recently announced its plan to subsidize the
Korean film industry. However, the details of the MCT's subsidy plan are
unclear, and the MCT appears intent on maintaining the screen quota in
addition to subsidies.
III. SCREEN QUOTAS VERSUS SUBSIDIES: THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
Korea is not the only country that has provided support and protection
for its domestic film industry. Many European countries protect their
cultural identities by protecting their film industries. 126 The European Union
("EU") issued what is known as the Television Without Frontiers Directive,
which sets quotas for televised audiovisual products. 127 Individually, many
EU member states also provide support to their domestic film industries in
the form of subsidies, screen quotas, or a combination of both. 128  The
European experience provides some perspective on the screen quota debate
in Korea. It suggests that subsidies more effectively protect and promote
domestic film industries than screen quotas.
A. The European Union
The EU protects European culture from the influence of American
films with its Television Without Frontiers Directive and by giving
126 See Kevin M. McDonald, Would You Like Your Television: With or Without Borders and with or
Without Culture-A New Approach to Media Regulation in the European Union, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1991, 1991 (1999); Michele Belluzzi, Cultural Protection As a Rationale for Legislation: The French
Language Law of 1994 and the European Trend Toward Integration in the Face of Increasing U.S.
Influence, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 127, 127 (1995).
127 Howard M. Endelman, Regulating Culture: The Audiovisual Controversy in the GA IT Accord, 18
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 443,445-46 (1995).
128 David H. Horowitz & Peter J. Davey, Financing American Films at Home and Abroad, 20
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 461,481-87 (1996); Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 210-12, 215-17.
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extensive subsidies to the European film industry.' 29  The Television
Without Frontiers Directive requires that at least fifty percent of audiovisual
products broadcast over European television be of European origin. 130  In
addition to the quotas, some EU member states provide both national and
regional subsidies aimed at protecting European culture.' 31  Because the
United States does not subsidize its domestic film industry, the availability
of foreign government subsidies has prompted many American producers to
invest in international co-productions with European companies.
132
1. Television Without Frontiers Directive
The EU adopted the Television Without Frontiers Directive (the
"Directive") in 1989 to curb the dominance of American films in Europe.' 33
The Directive sets minimum requirements for the showing of European
films on television. 134  Where practicable, member states must reserve a
majority of entertainment broadcast transmission time for European films. 135
Although the Directive allows each EU nation to set stricter quotas, 136
France is the only member country that has tried to do so. France has
eliminated the "where practicable" qualification and has established a forty-
percent ceiling on the broadcast time on television for non-European
films.
13 7
Some EU member states have expressed their skepticism about the
quota system. 138 The French government's effort to strengthen the quota, for
example, has not gained popularity among EU member states.' 39  As
129 See generally Craig R. Karpe, European Cultural Protectionism and the Socioeconomic Forces
That Will Defeat It, 5 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 425 (1995).
130 Prowda, supra note 94, at 195.
1 Horowitz & Davey, supra note 128, at 482-83.
132 Id. at 461-62.
133 Kirsten L. Kessler, Protecting Free Trade in Audiovisual Entertainment: A Proposal for
Counteracting the European Union's Trade Barriers to the U.S. Entertainment Industry's Exports, 26 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 563, 567 (1995).
134 Id. at 568.
135 Directive 89/552, Council Directive on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by
Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Television
Broadcasting Activities, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. art 4. (No. L 298) (1989).
136 Horowitz & Davey, supra note 128, at 486; see also Jonas M. Grant, Jurassic' Trade Dispute: The
Exclusion ofthe Audiovisual Sectorfrom the GATT, 70 IND. L.J. 1333, 1339 (1995).
137 Kessler, supra note 133, at 568; see also Diana Quintero, American Television and Cinema in
France and Europe, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 115, 118 (1994).
138 Horowitz & Davey, supra note 128, at 486-87.
139 See Stephen Bates, Hollywood to Coach EU Young Guns, GUARDIAN, Dec. 28, 1995, available in
1995 WL 9960985; see also Rejection Likely for Tightening of TV Quotas, HOLLYWOOD REP., Apr. 26,
1996, available in 1996 WL 16081186.
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Denmark's Minister of Culture Jyette Hilden stated, "Quotas are for
fisheries, not films.' 40  Germany's representative was quoted as saying,
"The vast majority (of ministers) don't think more quotas will work. This
sort of protectionism won't save us.' 14 1 Other than in France, which has
aggressively pursued protection of its film industry through the use of
quotas, screen quotas and other similar quotas seem to be disfavored in
European countries. 142
2. Subsidies
Subsidies play a vital role in the European film industry. 43 Each
year, more than sixty percent of European films receive national and
regional subsidies totaling $1 billion. 144 American film producers, lured by
these generous government subsidies, are increasing their involvement in
European productions, 145 and the steady decline in the number of European
productions from 1980 to 1994 is now leveling off because of an increase in
international co-productions. 1
46
The EU has two important public bodies that provide funds to
international co-productions.147 Eurimages, established in 1988 with twenty-
five member states including France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, 148
provides funds to co-productions that have at least three co-producers from
member states. 4 9 As long as foreign participation does not exceed thirty
percent of the total production cost, producers from non-member states may
access Eurimages funds.' 50 The European Convention on Cinematographic
Co-production (the "Convention") is another body that provides funds for
140 Horowitz & Davey, supra note 128, at 487.
141 Id.
142 Sandrine Cahn & Daniel Schimmel, The Cultural Exception: Does It Exist in GA TT and GATS
Frameworks? How Does It Affect or Is It Affected by the Agreement on TRIPS?, 15 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 281, 313 (1997); see generally Bill Grantham, America the Menace: France's Feud with
Hollywood, 15 WORLD POL'Y J. 58 (1998).
43 Horowitz & Davey, supra note 128, at 481-82.
'44 Id. at 481.
'45 Id. at 462.
146 Id. at 481.
141 Id. at 485-86.
148 The Europe of Cultural Cooperation: Eurimages: A Support Fund, available in Europe of Cultural
Co-operation Homepage (visited Apr. 20, 2000) <http://culture.coe.fr/Eurimages/eng/eleaflet.html>.
149 You Jeena, EU-ui Younghwasangup Donghyangkwa Younghwa Jinhungchak [EU's Film Industry
Status and Film Promotion Directives (1988-1997)], in SCREEN QUOTA AND CULTURAL SOVEREIGNTY,
supra note 1, at 265, 272.
1SO ECC: Eurimages: Regulations for the Support of Co-Production: Full Length Feature Films,
Animation and Documentaries sec. 1.5, available in Europe of Cultural Co-operation Homepage (visited
Apr. 27, 2000) <http://culture.coe.fr/Eurimages/eng/eeurprof.lm.html>.
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international co-productions.' 5' The Convention requires that the co-
productions be "European cinematographic work[s]" or at least "reflect a
European identity."' 52 These funds attract American producers who enjoy
no national subsidies in the United States. 53
B. Subsidies and Quotas in Individual European States
1. France
France has an extensive film subsidy program separate from that
operated by the EU. 154 France's program is designed to promote domestic
film production and distribution.' 5 There are two main avenues to obtain
film subsidies in France. First, a film producer can seek funding by applying
to the French Center for Cinematography for a direct payment of up to four
million francs.156 The sources of funding include an 11% tax on cinema
tickets, a reinvestment fund collected from a tax levied on television channel
revenues, and a 2.5% tax on sales of blank videocassettes and rentals. 57 In
1996, the center had a $360 million budget. 58  Second, the producer can
apply for funds from the Societe de Financement pour l'Industrie
Cinematographie ("SOFICA"),'59 which is funded by tax benefits provided
to individuals who invest in films through SOFICA. 160  SOFICA is
responsible for the increase in the number of domestic film productions in
France. 1 61
The French film industry is in crisis in terms of attracting audiences,
but the extensive subsidy program has encouraged innovation and
creativity. 162 American films dominate the French market. 163 French market
share plunged from 49.3% in 1987 to 27.8% in 1994.164 One explanation for
151 Marc Thomas, Financing Audiovisual Works in France and in Europe, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 495, 500 (1996). Signatory states include the United Kingdom, Austria, and Denmark. Id.
152 Horowitz & Davey, supra note 128, at 486.
' Id. at 462.
154 Grant, supra note 136, at 1340.
155 Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 211.
156 Horowitz & Davey, supra note 128, at 483.
157 Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 211.
158 Id.
159 Horowitz & Davey, supra note 128, at 483.
160 Amy Barrett, Investing: Reel Life: French Funds Have Star Potential, WALL ST. J. EUR., Feb. 19,
1999, available in 1999 WL-WSJE 5508035.
161 You Jeena, supra note 149, at 277-80. As a result of SOFICA, the number of films produced
increased from approximately 100 films per year in the early 1980s to 140 films per year in 1995. Id.
162 Prowda, supra note 94, at 202.
163 Thomas, supra note 151, at 502.
164 Prowda, supra note 94, at 202.
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this phenomenon is that French intellectuals view filmmaking as an art form,
scorn American films for representing "vulgar commercialism," and
continue to make films that people do not want to see. 165  The French
government also views films as art, and it has saved the French film industry
from extinction by providing subsidies that have encouraged "innovative
films, art house cinemas, independent distributors, film festivals, film
schools, and East European and African film production.' 66  As a result,
France now has a "small but viable film industry."'
67
2. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom does not have screen quotas.' 68  Instead, it
maintains a subsidy system that is very different from that of France.
69
British Screen Finance, owned by four corporations (Rank, United Artists'
Screen Entertainment, Channel Four, and Granada), provides a subsidy that
has a "quasi-commercial character."' 70  The organization uses an annual
government grant to lend money to high-quality films and profitable
filmmakers. 71It requires the films to be "commercial, and not only from aUK perspective. ' '172 It also gives incentives for UK-linked intemational co-
productions. 73 Under this system, the domestic market share of films made
in the United Kingdom has risen from 3% in 1993 to 23% in 1997.1
74
3. Spain
Spain protects its film industry by using a screen quota, a distribution
quota, and subsidies. 75  Spain's screen quota was enacted in 1941 to
165 Id. at 203.
166 id.
167 Id.
168 CHUNG JOONG HUN, supra note 9, at 18. The United Kingdom was one of the pioneers in
protecting domestic film industries. It adopted protection quotas in 1927. Thomas, supra note 151, at 496.
Since then, the United Kingdom has abolished the quota. CHUNG JOONG HUN, supra note 9, at 18.
Geraldine Higgins of the British Council in Korea stated that because the United Kingdom does not have a
measure similar to Korea's screen quota, the number of U.K. film productions has decreased. Id.
169 Horowitz & Davey, supra note 128, at 482-83. The United Kingdom also taxed box office
receipts and gave automatic support to its film industry. Thomas, supra note 151, at 496. The automatic
support given to the film industry has since been replaced with British Screen Finance. Id. at 497.




174 Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 236.
'71 Id. at 211; You Jeena, supra note 149, at 277-80.
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promote European films, 176 and it requires that twenty-five percent of the
films shown in Spain be European. 177 Under the distribution quota enacted
in 1946, a license must be obtained before a foreign film can be dubbed into
Spanish. 178 In addition to the quotas, Spain provides its film industry with
non-refundable subsidies of fifteen percent of the total box office receipts for
the first two years any film is shown. 179  This fifteen-percent subsidy,
adopted in 1994, has been instrumental in promoting the Spanish film
industry.180  Of these three measures, the subsidy scheme has proven to be
most effective, as it was not until the Spanish government began subsidizing
the film industry that it doubled its domestic market share.' 8'
C. Subsidies Are More Effective Than Screen Quotas at Promoting
Domestic Film Industries
The European experience suggests that subsidies as the only form of
protection are more effective than screen quotas at strengthening domestic
film industries. Subsidies are the only protective measure the United
Kingdom utilizes to protect its domestic film industry. 8 2 Under this system,
the U.K. film industry has been able to increase its share of the domestic
film market.'8 3 The French film industry, on the other hand, which protected
its market through both a screen quota and subsidies, is still struggling to
maintain its market share.' 84 The French film industry's recent success in
producing creative and innovative films, however, has been attributed to
French subsidy programs./s5 In the three years after the subsidy program
was adopted in Spain, the Spanish film industry doubled its market share.' 8 6
Spain has had a screen quota since 1941,187 but Spain's film industry was
able to markedly increase its domestic market share only after the subsidy
program was put into effect.' 8 8 In sum, the European experience with screen
:76 Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 212.
77 Id.
178 Id.; Karpe, supra note 129, at 431.
79 Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 212.
Igo Id.
'S1 Id. The market share of domestic films in Spain increased from 7.1% in 1994 to 14% in 1997. Id.
82 CHUNG JOONG HUN, supra note 9, at 18; see also Horowitz & Davey, supra note 128, at 482-83.
'93 Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 242 tbl. 4.
84 Quintero, supra note 137, at 116. "Assessing the U.S. film industry's penetration in France in the
late 1940s and in the 1990s, it is clear that quotas have been an ineffective means of limiting American film
dominance." Id.
185 See Prowda, supra note 94, at 202.
:86 Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 212.
157 You Jeena, supra note 149, at 279.
1:1 Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 212.
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quotas and subsidies indicates that subsidies are more effective at promoting
creativity and innovation in filmmaking and helping domestic film industries
increase their market shares.
IV. KOREA SHOULD REPLACE ITS SCREEN QUOTA WITH SUBSIDIES
In 1999, Korea's culture minister told the Korean film industry that it
should endeavor to preserve Korea's cultural identity and propel Korean
culture into the global arena and promised that the Korean government
would support the film industry. 189 In March 2000, the MCT announced a
comprehensive plan under which the MCT would continue to enforce the
screen quota and would also provide subsidies to the film industry.190 If the
Korean government wants to see Korean culture protected and promoted, it
must realize that its screen quota is only hurting the Korean film industry.
The strengthening and dissemination of Korean culture through films can be
achieved only through the production of quality Korean films that the public
wants to see. The screen quota, by encouraging the production of poor
quality films, has failed to stimulate the Korean film industry. Korea's
screen quota should thus be abolished entirely. Moreover, any subsidies
provided to the Korean film industry should be linked to the quality and
commercial viability of the films. Subsidies without additional protection
will help boost the Korean film industry's competitiveness.
A. Korean Films Must Be Protected
The variety of cultural attributes embodied in films' 91 makes them a
powerful medium through which to transmit cultural values and morals.
Arguably, the world is experiencing a strong trend toward cultural
globalization, 192 and no one nation is immune from the influences of the
cultures of other nations because culture, in many respects, defies national
boundaries. 193 However, different cultures must be preserved and allowed to
flourish, for it is a diversified global culture, and not a uniform culture, that
189 Shin Nakyun, Address at the 37th "Younghwaui Nat" (Film Day) Celebration, available in
Ministry of Culture and Tourism Homepage (Oct. 27, 1999) <http://www.mct.go.kr/uw3/dispatcher/
data room/.. ./speech s.html?oid=@9024>.
19 Lee Myung Cho, supra note 122.
191 Some of these cultural attributes include language, custom, tradition, art, music, screenwriting,
costume design, cinematography, and choreography. Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 230.
192 See W. Ming Shao, Is There No Business Like Show Business? Free Trade and Cultural
Protectionism, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 105, 139-41 (1995).
193 Id. at 140. Many cultures cannot be defined according to national boundaries. Id.
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benefits the world's collective well being. 194 Cultural diversification allows
people to observe different views and attitudes, test their own biases, and
learn from different experiences. 195 Unrestricted homogenization of cultures
should be avoided, and diversification of cultures should be championed.
Films that promote Korean culture and other cultures should thus be
protected.
B. The Screen Quota Neither Protects nor Promotes Korean Culture
Korea's screen quota has no effect on the content or quality of Korean
films, nor does it ensure that Korean films will reflect Korean culture.
While Korean films do exist, Korean culture is rarely seen in these films,'
96
and films that profess to depict Korean culture often misrepresent it.' 97 The
screen quota requires only that films made in Korea be shown 146 days out
of each year at any given theater. 98 It does not guarantee that Korcan films
will reflect Korean cultural values.
The screen quota guarantees that Korean films will be shown
regardless of their quality or commercial viability. If a film fails to generate
enough public interest, its messages, goals, and aesthetic values will not
reach the public. Films reflecting Korean culture do not help to achieve the
government's goal of promoting Korean culture when they are screened in
empty theaters. For this reason, the Korean government should find a
mechanism that both promotes Korean culture and encourages the
production of high-quality, commercially viable films.
The screen quota serves as an incentive for Korean film producers to
produce low-quality "quota quickies" because the screen quota requires only
that Korean theaters show Korean films. The Korean film industry currently
produces approximately fifty films each year.' 99 Many theater owners
complain that they cannot comply with the screen quota because there
1 4 Mitchell Stephens, Brave New World Pop Goes the World MTV in Prague, Pad Thai in Topeka-As
the World Shrinks, Cultures Blend and Diversity Disappears, L.A. TIMES MAG., Jan. 17, 1993, available in
1993 WL 2360578; see also McDonald, supra note 126, at 2011-12. "Diversity and balance between the
forms of culture being offered are crucial to the development of a truly democratic broadcasting system."
Id.
195 Stephens, supra note 194. David Marbury-Lewis, Harvard anthropology professor, notes that "[i]t
is important for us to understand the enormous variety of other ways humans can live their lives." Id.
Physicist Freeman Dyson also notes that "[i]t is likely that in the future our survival and our further
development will depend in an equally crucial way on the maintenance of cultural and biological
diversity." Id.
19 KIM Soo NAM, supra note 20, at 213-15.
197 id.
198 Presidential Decree, supra note 3, art. 19.
199 Kim Hyu-jong, supra note 14, at 73 tbl. 4.
VOL. 9 No. 2
KOREA'S SCREEN QUOTA
simply are not enough Korean films to show. 20 0 Because violations of the
screen quota carry heavy penalties,20 ' theater owners gladly pay for cheap
Korean films regardless of the films' quality or commercial viability. The
film industry meets this demand by supplying cheap films made solely for
the purpose of complying with the screen quota.2 °2 Furthermore, there is not
enough domestic competition to induce Korean filmmakers to produce
quality films. Since only about fifty Korean films are available during any
given year 203 to fill the 146-day quota requirement, 204 Korean films need not
compete vigorously with American films or with other Korean films.
Korea's screen quota does not encourage the Korean film industry to
produce quality films that will attract audiences.
In addition, the screen quota induces complacency on the part of the
Korean film industry toward global competitors. In his speech to film
industry leaders, the Korean culture minister emphasized the importance of
"developing a new and diversified Korean culture that would lead the
twenty-first century global culture., 20 5 As the Indian film industry's success
in creating a wide fan base in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia
shows, globalization does not necessarily require the creation of films that
are similar in style to the American films that currently dominate the world
206
market. It is possible for Korean films reflecting Korean culture to
become globally accepted. However, under the current quota system,
Korean actors, screenwriters, and staff members can earn money regardless
of the quality and global appeal of a film because the screen quota ensures
the showing of Korean films in the Korean market. In short, the screen
quota fails to encourage Korean filmmakers to produce quality films that
will attract both domestic and global audiences. The screen quota thus
hampers Korea's goal of promoting Korean culture through films.
200 Hwang Jang-jin, supra note 3.
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203 Kim Hyu-jong, supra note 14, at 73 tbl. 4.
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206 Carla Power et al., Bollywood Goes Global: America Isn't the Only Country That Knows How to
Spin and Export Fantasies. India's Pop Culture Is Huge, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Feb. 28, 2000. Bollywood,
India's film industry, has become a global industry. In Arab countries, fans prefer Hindi movies over
Hollywood movies. Egyptian cinema critic Ahmed Kamal even suggests that Indian films "are now simply
part of Arab culture." Id.
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C. Subsidies Would Better Protect the Korean Film Industry
A Korean art-house film called "Spring in My Hometown," by
Director Lee Kwangmo, exemplifies how a commercially viable film
embracing cultural values can disseminate Korean culture to both domestic
and global audiences. "Spring in My Hometown," released in 1998, gained
both critical acclaim and moderate commercial success.20 7 The film tells the
story of two boys in the war-ravaged Korea of the 1950s. 208 It won the Gold
Prize at the Tokyo International Film Festival and the Grand Prize at the
Hawaii International Film Festival. 20 9 What is striking about this art-house
film is that it gained such popularity, even among foreigners staying in
Korea, that the film was shown in theaters often at the request of the
foreigners.21 0
In order to encourage the production of more films like "Spring in My
Hometown," the Korean government should provide subsidies to the film
industry. The best way to promote the Korean film industry is to utilize
subsidies without additional protection.211 The experiences of European
countries have proven that subsidies stimulate domestic film industries.21 2
In France, subsidies have encouraged innovative and creative filmmaking.213
The U.K. subsidy system appears to have helped the U.K. film industry to
improve its market share.214 Spain had a screen quota and a distribution
quota for years, but it was only when the government began subsidizing the
film industry that it doubled its market share. 215 The European experience
seems to indicate that subsidies could improve both the quality and
commercial viability of Korean films.
The quasi-commercial subsidy system in the United Kingdom and the
EU regional subsidies can serve as models for Korea. While the French
system has proven effective in promoting innovation and creativity in
207 KOREAN INFO. SERV., FACTS ABOUT KOREA 142 (1999).
208 Song Jung A, supra note 2.
209 KOREAN INFO. SERV., supra note 207, at 142.
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211 See Robin L. Van Harpen, Mamas, Don't Let Your Babies Grow up to Be Cowboys: Reconciling
Trade and Cultural Independence, 4 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 165, 191 (1995). Subsidies without
additional protection are the most efficient way to promote cultural industries because (1) subsidy costs are
easier to determine and their distributive effects are more identifiable, (2) subsidies reduce the costs of local
producers without interfering with the public's freedom of choice, and (3) the market continues to reward
high quality and punish mediocrity. Id.
12 See supra Part III.
213 Prowda, supra note 94, at 205.
214 Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 215.
215 Id. at 212.
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French filmmaking,21 6 it has failed to recognize the importance of the
commercial viability of films. 217 The French film industry faces criticism
that it is producing films that no one wants to see.218 Spain utilizes both
quotas and subsidies.219 While the United Kingdom does not have screen
quotas, it requires film projects to be of high quality and to show potential
for commercial success in order to qualify for a subsidy.220 This system
helped the domestic film industry in the United Kingdom to increase its
share of the U.K. market. 22' Because both quality and commercial viability
are required for the films to effectively promote and disseminate culture, the
U.K. system provides a good model for Korea to follow. Also, the EU
regional subsidies demonstrate the importance of encouraging international
co-productions; 222 Hollywood and independent filmmakers realize the
benefits of tapping into these subsidies and have increased their investment
22in Europe. 23 As the Korean film industry needs more capital as well as
access to advanced filmmaking technology, Korea should adopt a similar
provision in its subsidy scheme to encourage co-productions.
Although Korea has announced a new film subsidy program, it has not
released any details about the program and has decided to maintain its
current screen quota. By maintaining the screen quota, Korea runs the risk
that the production of low-quality films will continue. Moreover, although
the announcement of a subsidy program is a positive step, Korea should tie
such subsidies to film quality and cultural content. With little modification,
Korea could successfully implement a U.K.-style system of quasi-
commercial subsidies for Korean films. The Korean government could set
up a body similar to British Screen Finance that would lend money to film
projects that portray Korean culture and demonstrate potential profitability.
Expert advisory panels could be assembled to assess the projects that would
qualify for the loans. This system should be open to both domestic and
foreign film studios to attract foreign investors with deep pockets. Access to
public subsidies will encourage foreign investors to co-produce intercultural
films in Korea. Co-productions with foreign investors, in turn, will expose
the Korean film industry to advanced film production technologies.
Through the enactment of a subsidy program, the Korean film industry could
216 Prowda, supra note 94, at 205.
2I7 Id. at 203.
21 Id. at 204.
219 See supra Part III.B.3.
220 Horowitz & Davey, supra note 128, at 482-83; see also supra Part III.B.2.
221 Kim Joongi, supra note 38, at 215.
222 See supra Part III.A.2.
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accumulate capital, strengthen its infrastructure, and become globally
competitive. By tying subsidies to film quality, cultural content, and
commercial viability, the Korean government could create a competitive
domestic film industry that promotes Korean culture.
V. CONCLUSION
Korea's screen quota should be repealed because it encourages the
Korean film industry to produce films of poor quality that are not
commercially viable. Moreover, the quota only requires that Korean
companies make the films, not that the films reflect Korean culture. As a
result, despite the fact that the screen quota has been in existence for more
than thirty years, the Korean domestic film industry continues to be
dominated by foreign films.
Government subsidies linked to film quality, cultural content, and
commercial viability would encourage the Korean film industry to produce
quality films that reflect Korean culture and values. Subsidized domestic
film industries in Europe continue to strengthen their competitiveness.
United States film production companies, lured by the advantages of
accessing subsidies in Europe, have increased their investment in the
European film industry. Government subsidies in Korea could energize the
Korean film industry by promoting quality and profitability and by attracting
foreign companies to invest in co-productions with Korean filmmakers. It is
only through such a strengthened domestic film industry that the government
can achieve its ultimate objective of preserving Korean culture through
Korean films.
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